This paper analyzes a nonlinear opinion dynamics model which generalizes the DeGroot model by introducing a bias parameter for each individual. The original DeGroot model is recovered when the bias parameter is equal to zero. The magnitude of this parameter reflects an individual's degree of bias when assimilating new opinions, and depending on the magnitude, an individual is said to have weak, intermediate, and strong bias. The opinions of the individuals lie between 0 and 1. It is shown that for strongly connected networks, the equilibria with all elements equal identically to the extreme value 0 or 1 is locally exponentially stable, while the equilibrium with all elements equal to the neutral consensus value of 1 2 is unstable. Regions of attraction for the extreme consensus equilibria are given. For the equilibrium consisting of both extreme values 0 and 1, which corresponds to opinion polarization according to the model, it is shown that the equilibrium is unstable for all strongly connected networks if individuals all have weak bias, becomes locally exponentially stable for complete and two-island networks if individuals all have strong bias, and its stability heavily depends on the network topology when individuals have intermediate bias.
Abstract-This paper analyzes a nonlinear opinion dynamics model which generalizes the DeGroot model by introducing a bias parameter for each individual. The original DeGroot model is recovered when the bias parameter is equal to zero. The magnitude of this parameter reflects an individual's degree of bias when assimilating new opinions, and depending on the magnitude, an individual is said to have weak, intermediate, and strong bias. The opinions of the individuals lie between 0 and 1. It is shown that for strongly connected networks, the equilibria with all elements equal identically to the extreme value 0 or 1 is locally exponentially stable, while the equilibrium with all elements equal to the neutral consensus value of 1 2 is unstable. Regions of attraction for the extreme consensus equilibria are given. For the equilibrium consisting of both extreme values 0 and 1, which corresponds to opinion polarization according to the model, it is shown that the equilibrium is unstable for all strongly connected networks if individuals all have weak bias, becomes locally exponentially stable for complete and two-island networks if individuals all have strong bias, and its stability heavily depends on the network topology when individuals have intermediate bias.
Analysis on star graphs and simulations show that additional equilibria may exist where individuals form clusters.
I. INTRODUCTION
There has been a persistent interest in theoretical sociology over the past decades in the modeling and study of opinion formation processes [2] . A variety of models have been proposed and studied to understand how the opinions of an interconnected social group evolve and how limiting phenomena arise, including consensus, polarization, and clustering.
The French-DeGroot model [11] is probably the most wellknown (referred to as DeGroot henceforth for simplicity); each individual repeatedly updates his/her opinion to be a weighted average of the opinions of his/her neighbors (perhaps including him/herself), reflecting the subconscious human cognitive capability of taking convex combinations when processing new information [6] . The opinions of the individuals will eventually reach a consensus as long as the interaction network satisfies some appropriate connectivity requirements. Over the years, a number of discrete-and continuous-time variants of the DeGroot model have been proposed and studied extensively. Notable among them include the Friedkin-Johnsen model [13] , the Hegselmann-Krause model [8] , [17] , the Altafini model [3] , [20] , [25] , and the DeGroot-Friedkin model [19] , [26] . For recent advances in the modelling of opinion dynamics on influence networks, see [5] . Weiguo The phenomenon of extremization, which refers to the tendency for a group of individuals to eventually reach opinions that are more extreme than their initial inclination (and perhaps polarizing into two opposite camps), has become of increasing relevance in the modern age, and is the focus of research from several scientific communities [1] . Most of the models discussed above are not able to predict polarization or extremization. Some models do exist in the literature which can predict polarization or extremization [12] , [15] , [22] , but typically attributes this phenomenon to antagonistic interactions that increase in strength as the difference in opinions between individuals grow, and only [15] has provided analysis for its proposed model.
Biased assimilation is the phenomenon in social psychology in which individuals tend to process new information with a bias towards their current position, accepting confirming evidence while evaluating disconfirming evidence critically [21] . This can result in an individual developing a more extreme opinion when exposed to information from a confirming and disconfirming source [23] , [24] . A new generalization of the DeGroot model was recently proposed in [10] , where a bias parameter helps to capture the cognitive processes described in the preceding two sentences. For homophilous networks, it has been shown that under some specific conditions, polarization arises if the individuals are sufficiently biased and consensus is reached under some other specific initial opinions for a small bias parameter close to zero [10] . However, the situation that the system converges to consensus is rarely observed for other initial states. The recent work [9] presented analysis on some equilibria and stability properties but for undirected networks.
A. Contributions of this paper
In this paper, we further examine the stability of the equilibria of the model proposed in [10] , in which the opinion of each individual takes a value between 0 and 1, to gain more insight into the role of biased assimilation in opinion formation processes. The bias parameter is represented by a scalar b i for individual i, and may be heterogeneous among the individuals.
The key focus of this paper is on extremization phenomena, including the formation of polarized communities. Focusing on strongly connected networks, our findings and contributions can be summarised as • A detailed, quantitative argument to illustrate how bias assimilation is captured in the model and the role of the bias parameter b i in determining the intensity for individual i. • The extreme consensus equilibria, where all opinions are equal to the extreme values of 0 or 1, are locally exponentially stable for all b i > 0. Regions of attraction are given when all b i ≥ 1.
• The neutral consensus equilibrium, where all opinions are equal to 0.5, is shown to be unstable when all b i > 0 and locally exponentially stable when all b i are negative and close to 0. • The set of extreme polarization equilibria is those in which all individuals are divided into two non-empty sets of opinions equal to extreme values of 0 or 1. When all b i ∈ (0, 1), this set of equilibria is unstable. • By considering special classes of topologies, stronger results are obtained on the extreme polarization equilibria. For undirected complete networks, instability also occurs for b i = 1, but the equilibria are locally exponentially stable when b i > 1. For two-island networks representing two homophilous communities, the equilibria are locally exponentially stable when b i ≥ 1. • A complete characterisation of the equilibria and their stability is obtained for star networks. • Detailed discussions are provided for the findings on each of the above types of equilibria, and social interpretations and implications are examined.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the biased opinion dynamics model. Section III analyzes the equilibria and their stability for the model under a general graph topology and discusses some classes of specific graphs with the proofs given in Section IV. Section V provides several simulations to illustrate a rich set of possible dynamic behaviors possible, including some not covered in the analysis. Section VI concludes the paper.
Notation: For a positive integer N , let 1 N and 0 N denote the N -dimensional all-one vector and all-zero vector, respectively. Let I N ×N and O N ×N denote the N × N identity matrix and zero matrix, respectively. We will use the terms "individual" and "agent" interchangeably.
II. THE MODEL FOR OPINION DYNAMICS WITH BIAS ASSIMILATION
Consider a group of N agents labeled by 1 to N . Each agent can receive information only from its neighbors. The neighbor relationships among the N agents are characterized by an N -node directed graph represented by G = (V, E), where V = {1, . . . , N } is the node set and E is the edge set. The graph is associated with a weight matrix W = (w ij ) N ×N where the self-weight w ii ≥ 0, and if (j, i) ∈ E, then w ij > 0. Let N i = {j ∈ V : (j, i) ∈ E} be the set of neighbors of agent i, representing the other agents j that have influence on i. Note that no self-loop is allowed in the graph G and therefore i ∈ N i for i = 1, . . . , N , but the self-weight w ii can be positive. A directed path from node p 1 to node p k is a sequence of edges of the form (p 1 , p 2 ), (p 2 , p 3 ), ..., (p k−1 , p k ) where p i ∈ V are distinct and (p i , p i+1 ) ∈ E. A graph is strongly connected if there is a path from every node to every other node, which is equivalent to W being irreducible.
Each agent i has a real-valued opinion x i (k), on a given issue being discussed, which may change over time k. At every discrete time instant k = 0, 1, . . ., each agent i updates its opinion by setting
,
, and w ij , i, j ∈ V, are the elements in the weight matrix W representing the influence weights. The bias of agent i is captured by the parameter b i , and is assumed to be nonnegative except for a special scenario considered in the sequel. Observe that on the right hand side of (1), the numerator is nonnegative and the denominator is greater than or equal to the numerator for any
We assume from here on that x i (0) ∈ [0, 1] for all i ∈ V, and 0 and 1 represent the extreme opinions of opposing points of view on the given topic, respectively. By way of example, suppose the issue being discussed was the statement "recreational marijuana should be legalized", then x i = 0 and x i = 1 correspond to individual i totally opposing and totally supporting the legalization of marijuana. Consequently, x i (k) can be regarded as agent i's degree of support at time k for the extreme opinion represented by 1, and so correspondingly 1 − x i (k) can be regarded as the degree of support for the extreme opinion represented by 0. The reader is referred to [5, Section 2.2] for further details.
We now give an intuitive explanation on how the model (1) captures bias assimilation, and provide quantitative arguments in the next subsection. Readers may also refer to [10] , which first proposed the model. One can consider s i (k) = j∈Ni w ij x j (k) and d i − s i (k) = j∈Ni w ij (1 − x j (k)) to be the weighted average support for the position represented by 1 and 0, respectively. When b i > 0 and supposing for example that x i (k) > 0, (1) indicates that individual i applies a larger weight of x i (k) bi to s i (k), and a smaller weight of (1 − x i (k)) bi to d i − s i (k). This represents the biased assimilation phenomenon [21] , which explains that individuals may process new information with a bias, being more readily inclined to accept evidence confirming their existing views while evaluating disconfirming evidence critically, perhaps even rejecting it. We remark that when b i = 0 for all i ∈ V, (1) simplifies to the classical DeGroot model [11] .
A. Exploring the Bias Parameter's Effect
In this section, we look closely at the effect of the bias parameter b i > 0 on the dynamics in (1) and show that when b i > 0, each individual assimilates new information with a bias towards information supporting his or her current opinion, and the value of b i determines the level of bias. To do so, we construct a specific example to understand the opinion update of a single individual i in the presence of equal information from both ends of the opinion spectrum. The example imposes some additional assumptions, which are not restrictive; the same conclusions can be drawn with other similar assumptions.
Suppose that w ij = 1 for all i, j ∈ V, and that the neighbors of i have opinions that yield s i = j∈Ni
there is an equal influence from i's neighbors on both ends of the opinion spectrum 1 . The update equation (1) of individual i can be rewritten as
Evidently, the DeGroot update equation of individual i is
First, observe that
where
and therefore ∂g(bi,x) ∂x > 0. Combined with the fact that g(b i , 1 2 ) = 0 for b i > 0, one has that g(b i , x) > 0 for all b i > 0 and x ∈ (0.5, 1), and g(b i , x) < 0 for all b i > 0 and x ∈ (0, 0.5). It follows from (2) that p(b i , x) > p(0, x) for all b i > 0 and x ∈ (0.5, 1), and p(b i , x) < p(0, x) for all b i > 0 and x ∈ (0, 0.5).
Note that when b i = 1, one has p(1,
We summarize the above observations in the following
x for x ∈ (0, 0.5). Item 1) indicates that individual i's next opinion x i (k + 1) under the bias model update rule (1) is closer to the polarized value of 0 (if x i (k) ∈ (0, 0.5)) or 1 (if x i (k) ∈ (0.5, 1)) when compared to x i (k + 1) = p(0, x i (k)) of an individual i described by the DeGroot model. It is by this mechanism that (1) captures an individual who, for b i > 0, assimilates a balanced mixture of influence with a bias, more readily accepting neighboring information that supports his or her current opinion, while placing a lower weight on neighboring information that opposes his or her current opinion.
Item 2) illustrates a biased individual whose non-neutral opinion remains unchanged in the presence of equal information from both ends of the opinion spectrum; there is a perfect balance between biased assimilation and social influence from neighbors' opinions. Item 3) indicates that when b i > 1, biased assimilation overpowers the social influence, and the individual tends to an extreme opinion, even though the overall social influence due to the neighbors' opinions is unchanged. This represents the scenario in which "biased assimilation causes individuals to arrive at more extreme opinions after being exposed to identical, inconclusive evidence" [21] . Item 4) shows an individual whose the level of biased assimilation is not sufficient to overcome the mix of information from neighbors' opinions (social influence). Thus, x i tends to 0.5, which is when the social influence from both ends of the spectrum is equal. Based on the above discussion, we say
Remark 1: For some models, each individual has a parameter describing her susceptibility to external influence (the parameter is constant in [14] and opinion-dependent in [4] ). However, both models share the same property; when an individual i is exposed to two equal pieces of opinions from either end of the spectrum, the opinion furthest from opinion x i is more attractive. This contrasts our conclusion above; for an individual i with b i > 0, the opinion closer to opinion x i is more attractive.
III. MAIN RESULTS
In this section, we present the theoretical results, interweaved with discussion and interpretation in the social context, with the proofs presented in the next section. We will study the equilibria (and also their stability) of the system (1) for both b i > 0 and b i < 0. It turns out that this is a challenging problem in general and some results we obtain only establish local stability.
Let
The update of the opinions of all N individuals in the network is rewritten as
It can be verified that for b i > 0, we have that 0 N , 1 N , and 1 2 1 N are equilibria of system (3) . We refer to x * = 0 N and x * = 1 N as extreme consensus and x * = 1 2 1 N as neutral consensus. Any vector with all entries either 0 or 1 is also an equilibrium; without loss of generality, we denote such an equilibrium as [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T with n 1 + n 2 = N and represents polarization of the network. Let the extreme, neutral consensus, and polarization equilibria of the system (3) be respectively denoted by
Besides the above equilibria, there may exist other equilibria of the system depending on the graph G, the value of the bias parameter b i , and the weights w ij . We give examples in the sequel. If the bias parameter b i < 0 but is close to 0, then x * d = 1 2 1 N is an equilibrium of system (3) . Though a rigorous proof is missing, we conjecture the following based on numerous simulations.
Conjecture: For a given network topology and initial states, if the system (3) with b i = 0 for all i ∈ V converges (DeGroot model), then the system (3) with b i > 0 for all i ∈ V will also converge.
A. Extreme and Neutral Consensus Equilibria
We first discuss stability of equilibria corresponding to extreme consensus and neutral consensus.
Theorem 1: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly connected and b i > 0, ∀i ∈ V. Then, x * a = 0 N and x * c = 1 N are locally exponentially stable equilibria and x * d = 1 2 1 N is an unstable equilibrium of system (3).
In the social context, the result of Theorem 1 indicates that individuals' biased assimilation makes it possible for a network to reach a consensus that is more extreme (x(∞) = 1 N and x(∞) = 0 N ) than any individual's initial opinion x i (0). For example, one could have x i (0) ∈ (1 − ǫ 1 , 1 − ǫ 2 ) for all i, with sufficiently small ǫ 1 > ǫ 2 > 0, and we get
This points to the dangers of biased assimilation in a network of individuals who all begin with similar opinions. One could say the network of individuals is "self-extremizing". Theorem 1 also tells us that when individuals exhibit biased assimilation, it is unlikely for a network to reach the unstable state of neutral consensus (in which every individual adopts the neutral opinion). However, it might be possible that stable equilibria exist in which a subset of the individuals (but not all) adopt the neutral opinion. For many established models [3] , [11] , [14] , [17] , the example initial states above will yield max i x i (0) ≥ max i x i (∞). Some models [12] , [15] , [22] can have max i x i (0) < max i x i (∞), but only exhibit extreme polarization (see Section III-B below) exists in [12] , [15] , [22] , and not extreme consensus.
The paper [10] showed that the biased assimilation model exhibits extreme polarization [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T in a two-island network, which is also not present in the existing models. Since [10] requires that n 1 = 0 and n 2 = 0, this means that [10] does not study the stability of extreme consensus states, as in our paper (extreme consensus can be considered as a special case of the polarization equilibria, with n 1 = 0 or n 2 = 0). We now detail a result on when the neutral consensus equilibrium is stable.
Theorem 2: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly connected, w ii > 0 and b i ∈ [−ǫ, 0), ∀i ∈ V. If ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small, then x * d = 1 2 1 N is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of the system (3).
To get some idea on the region of attraction of equilibria corresponding to extreme consensus (i.e. those reported in Theorem 1), we present the following result with the system starting from some restricted initial states.
Theorem 3: Consider the system (3), and let b i ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V. Suppose that the neighbor graph G is strongly connected. Then, 1) If x i (0) ≥ 0.5 for all i ∈ V and there exists at least one j ∈ V such that x j (0) > 0.5, then x i (k) will asymptotically converge to 1 for all i ∈ V. 2) If x i (0) ≤ 0.5 for all i ∈ V and there exists at least one j ∈ V such that x j (0) < 0.5, then x i (k) will asymptotically converge to 0 for all i ∈ V.
From Theorem 3, we conclude that for b i ≥ 1, the region of attraction for extreme consensus is in fact quite large. In particular, for individuals with intermediate or strong levels of biased assimilation, a network will "self-extremize" to a state of extreme consensus if all individuals begin on the same side of the opinion spectrum (x i (0) ≥ 0.5 or x i (0) ≤ 0.5 for all i), even if initially the individuals have varying degrees of support for the position at 1 or 0. An echo chamber [7] is a scenario whereby an individual only has access to information that supports his or her current opinion (this access may be a deliberate result of the individual's actions, or an unintended consequence of enabling technology, e.g. recommender systems). Theorem 3 illustrates the dangerous consequence, viz. extreme consensus, of having individuals with intermediate/strong bias assimilation together in an echo chamber.
B. Polarization Equilibria
For the stability of the equilibrium x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T corresponding to polarization, we have the following results on strongly connected graphs, complete graphs and two-island networks introduced below.
Theorem 4: If the neighbor graph G is strongly connected, and b i ∈ (0, 1) for all i ∈ V, then the equilibrium (3) is unstable for every n 1 = 1, . . . , N − 1.
Theorem 5: For an undirected complete neighbor graph G with weights w ij = 1, i = j, i, j ∈ V, the equilibrium x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T of the system (3), with n 1 = 2, . . . , N − 2, is unstable when b i = 1 for all i ∈ V and is locally exponentially stable when b i > 1 for all i ∈ V.
Next we introduce the two-island network model studied in [10] , which is used to model a homophilous network. Consider an undirected network in which the nodes in V are partitioned into two types, say τ 1 , τ 2 . Let V i denote the set of nodes of type τ i and |V i | = n i , i = 1, 2. Without loss of generality, assume that V 1 = {1, . . . , n 1 } and V 2 = {n 1 + 1, . . . , N }. Assume that each node in V 1 has n 1 p s neighbors in V 1 and n 1 p d neighbors in V 2 , and each node in V 2 has n 2 p s neighbors in V 2 and n 2 p d neighbors in V 1 , where p s , p d ∈ (0, 1) and n 1 p s , n 1 p d , n 2 p s , n 2 p d are all integers.
Theorem 6: Suppose that the neighbor graph G is a connected two-island network and w ij = 1, i = j, i, j ∈ V. Then, x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of the system (3) when b i ≥ 1 for all i ∈ V.
The above theorem results can be summarized in context as follows. Theorem 4 establishes a result of particular interest when considered in conjunction with Theorem 1. The results show that a network of individuals with weak bias, b i ∈ (0, 1), can converge to an extreme consensus (which is undesirable), the same weak bias ensures that polarization (a different type of undesirable equilibrium) is an unstable phenomenon. Theorem 4 also tells us it is unlikely for a network to converge to a polarized state if individuals are only weakly biased. The phenomenon of polarization is stable only when individuals have intermediate or strong levels of bias (Theorems 5 and 6). Efforts to reduce polarization could therefore first focus on reducing individual bias as opposed to e.g. changing network structure or introducing agents into the network strategically.
Remark 2: The two-island network was also analyzed in [10] , but with convergence to results secured for initial states restricted to satisfy [10] also provided a relaxation on the initial states, requiring that b
In contrast, we analyze the local stability and instability of the polarization equilibrium for varying values of the bias parameter b i . Based on numerous simulations where we sampled x i (0) from a uniform distribution in [0, 1], we observed that polarization occurs for a large set of strongly connected network topologies, such as regular graphs, complete graphs, random graphs, and small-world graphs, if b i is much larger than 1, while for specific network topologies like path graphs and star graphs, polarization does not occur.
The system (3) can have other equilibria and can exhibit rich asymptotic behaviors as will be illustrated in Section V. The following theorem establishes a case when other types of equilibria of the system (3) exist and their stability is discussed.
Theorem 7:
Consider an undirected star graph with the weights w ij = 1, i = j, i, j ∈ V. Without loss of generality, suppose that node 1 is the center node. The equilibria of system (3) include those vectors whose elements are either zero or one, and x * = [ 1 2 , a 2 , . . . , a N ] T with a i ∈ [0, 1] and N i=2 a i = N −1 2 . If N is odd, the system has additional equilibria of the form
] T with c ∈ (0, 1). Among these equilibria, x * a = 0 N , and ] T with c ∈ (0, 1). Theorem 7 establishes that it is possible under biased assimilation to split a star network so that the leaf nodes separate into 2 nonempty factions, one supporting the opinion represented by 1, and the other supporting the opinion represented by 0. In fact, the support can be of varying levels of intensity, with different faction sizes, since one only requires that a i ∈ [0, 1] and N i=2 a i = N −1 2 . The centre node acts as a mediating individual to the two factions. However, such an equilibrium is unstable.
IV. ANALYSES
In this section, we prove the theorems in the previous section. We linearize the system (3) to analyze the local stability of these equilibria. Let g i (x) w ii +x bi i s i +(1−x i ) bi (d i −s i ) for i = 1, . . . , N . By calculation, one obtains that the Jacobian of F (x(k)) in (3), ∂F ∂x = ( ∂fi ∂xj ) N ×N , has entries
and
for l = i and i, l ∈ V.
. . , N . The spectral radius of square matrix M is denoted as ρ(M ). Before proving the theorems, the following lemma is first introduced that will be used later. 
, and ∂f i ∂x l x * a = 0, for l = i.
Thus, the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x * a = 0 N becomes
, . . . ,
.
Note that g i (x * a ) = w ii + j∈Ni w ij . The eigenvalues of P are w ii /(w ii + j∈Ni w ij ), i ∈ V, which lie in the interval [0, 1) as long as each agent has at least one neighbor. Since G is strongly connected, ρ(P ) < 1 and thus the equilibrium x * a = 0 N is locally exponentially stable. For the equilibrium x * c = 1 N , observe that for i ∈ V, one
, and ∂f i ∂x l x * c = 0, for l = i
Thus the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x * c = 1 N becomes
The eigenvalues of P are w ii /(w ii + d i ), i ∈ V, which lie in the interval [0, 1) as in the previous case. Thus the equilibrium x * c = 1 N is locally exponentially stable.
For the equilibrium x * d = 1 2 1 N , one obtains g i (x * d ) = w ii + d i /2 bi , for all i ∈ V. It can be further calculated that
, for l = i.
(6) The above implies that the Jacobian matrix P ∂F ∂x | x * d at x * d = 1 2 1 N is a nonnegative matrix. Using Lemma 1 and (6), one can compute that the spectral radius obeys
Thus x * d = 1 2 1 N is an unstable equilibrium. Proof of Theorem 2: Similar calculations to the proof of Theorem 1 shows that the Jacobian matrix evaluated at x * d = 1 2 1 N , denoted P ∂F ∂x | x * d , has the same entries as in (6) . The off-diagonal elements of P are nonnegative. Since w ii > 0
for all i ∈ V, and hence P is a nonnegative matrix. By Lemma 1, the spectral radius of P satisfies that
Therefore x * d = 1 2 1 N is a locally exponentially stable equilibrium of the system (3) for b i ∈ [−ǫ, 0) when ǫ is sufficiently small.
Proof of Theorem 3: We first prove item 1). Consider any i ∈ V, and observe that
Proving that x i (k + 1) − x i (k) ≥ 0 is equivalent to proving that ζ i (x(k)) ≥ 0 since the denominator of the equation above is positive. Rearranging the terms in ζ i (x), and recalling that d i = j∈Ni w ij and s i = j∈Ni w ij x j , yields
holds for all j ∈ N i . Trivially, (7) holds if x i = 1, so let us consider x i ∈ [0.5, 1). Notice that x i ∈ [0.5, 1) ⇒ (1 − x i )/x i ≤ 1 with equality if and only if x i = 0.5. Thus, (7) holds if x i ∈ [0.5, 1), with equality if and only if x j = 0.5 and either (i) b i = 1 or (ii) x i = 0.5. With x j ∈ [0.5, 1], j ∈ N i , we can then conclude that
x i (k+1) ≥ x i (k) for all i ∈ V and all time k. Moreover, since there exists at least one j ∈ V such that x j (0) > 0.5 and G is strongly connected, unless x i (0) = 1 for all i ∈ V, there exists a p ∈ V such that p = j and x p (1) > x p (0) ≥ 0.5. Repeating this argument, one concludes that there exists a finite τ such that x i (k) > 0.5 for all i ∈ V and k ≥ τ . Consider the Lyapunov function V (x(k)) = 1 − min i∈V x i (k). From (1), if x i (k) = 1, then x i (k + 1) = 1, which implies that if x i (0) = 1, then x i (k) = 1 for all time k. Thus, if x i (k) = 1 for all i ∈ V at some time k, then V (x(k)) = 0 and V (x(k + 1)) = 0. Suppose that there exists at least one agent p such that x p (k) < 1 at a specific time k. Without loss of generality, assume k ≥ τ . From the preceding discussion, x p (k + 1) > x p (k), which implies that min i∈V x i (k + 1) > min i∈V x i (k), and thus V (x(k + 1)) < V (x(k)). By Lyapunov's stability theorem for discrete-time autonomous systems [16, Theorem 13.2] , lim k→∞ x i (k) = 1 asymptotically for all i ∈ V.
Item 2) can be proved using arguments similar to those in the proof of item 1), with the Lyapunov function V (x(k)) = max i∈V x i (k).
Before proving Theorems 4-6, we calculate the elements of the Jacobian matrix of the system (3) at the equilibrium
For agent i that satisfies x * ei = 0, it is easy to see that
, and ∂fi ∂x l | x * e = 1 g 2 i (x * e ) x * ei bi = 0 for l = i. For agent i that satisfies x * ei = 1, one has g i (x * e ) = w ii + d
i . Eq. (4) then yields
and for l = i, (5) evaluates to be
i )] = 0.
Proof of Theorem 4: Since the graph is strongly connected, for any equilibrium x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T with n 1 + n 2 = N and a given n 1 ∈ {1, . . . , N − 1}, there exists an agent l such that x * el = 1 and d
In view of (9), the Jacobian matrix at the equilibrium x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T is a diagonal matrix with at least one element equal to +∞. Therefore, the equilibrium
Proof of Theorem 5: When b i = 1 for all i ∈ V, for agent i with x * ei = 0 and agent l with x * el = 1, one has
respectively. Then the Jacobian matrix P = ∂F ∂x | x * e at the equilibrium
Suppose that n 1 ≥ n 2 . For the i-th agent with x * ei = 1, in view of (10), the i-th diagonal element of P is given by p ii = (w ii + n 1 )/(w ii + n 2 − 1) > 1. If n 1 < n 2 , one can similarly show that there exists a diagonal element of P that is greater than 1. In both cases, P has an eigenvalue greater than 1. Therefore the equilibrium
Since the graph is complete and
Then the Jacobian matrix P = ∂F ∂x | x * e evaluated at the equilibrium
and has spectral radius ρ(P ) < 1. It follows that x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T is locally exponentially stable when b i > 1 for all i ∈ V.
Proof of Theorem 6: From the definition of the two-island network model, the following inequalities hold
For b i = 1 and b i > 1, the Jacobian matries are given by (10) and (11), respectively. In both cases, one can see that the eigenvalues of P lie in the interval [0, 1) and thus x * e = [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T is locally exponentially stable. Proof of Theorem 7: Let x * = [x * 1 , x * 2 , . . . , x * N ] T be an equilibrium of the system (3) . If x * 1 = 1, then one can show that x * i , i = 2, . . . , N, can only be either 0 or 1. The same conclusion holds for the case when x * 1 = 0. Hence 1 N , 0 N , and [0 T n1 , 1 T n2 ] T with n 1 +n 2 = N, are equilibria of the system. Suppose that x * 1 = 1 and x * 1 = 0. For the center node, it follows from
For the nodes i = 2, . . . , N , it should hold that
Suppose there exists some i ∈ {2, . . . , N } such that x * i = 0 and x * i = 1. Then, (13) holds if x * 1 = 1 2 . In conclusion, ] T with c ∈ (0, 1).
We first discuss the stability of the polarization equilibria. Note that node 1 is the center. Consider an equilibrium whose first element is 0 and there exists some other element, say i, whose value is 1. Then according to the Jacobian matrix P given by (10) , its i-th diagonal element is p ii = (w ii + d
i ) = (w ii + 1)/w ii . Since p ii > 1, such an equilibrium is unstable. The stability of an equilibrium with the first element equal to 1 can be similarly discussed.
We now check the stability of the equilibria x * = [ 1 2 , a 2 , . . . , a N ] T . The Jacobian matrix P at the equilibria
which is nonnegative. Suppose without loss of generality that 0 < a i < 1, 2 ≤ i ≤ k, for some 2 ≤ k ≤ N , and a j = 0 or a j = 1, for k + 1 ≤ j ≤ N . Then the leading principle submatrix P k of order k of P is irreducible and can be written as
From Lemma 1, it follows that ρ(P k ) is an eigenvalue of P k and
Since ρ(P k ) is an eigenvalue of P as well, the spectral radius ρ(P ) > 1 and thus the equilibria x * = [ 1 2 , a 2 , . . . , a N ] T are unstable. Now consider the case when N is odd. The Jacobian P at the equilibria
which is a nonnegative matrix. If c = 1 2 , then either w22+c w22+1−c or wNN +1−c wNN +c will be larger than 1. Therefore the equilibria
] T , consider a small perturbation around this equilibrium. Take the initial condition of the system (3) as
where c > 1 2 is close to 1 2 and a > 0 is close to 0. It is clear that for the agents i = (N + 1)/2 + 1, . . . , N , x i (k) = 1 for all k ≥ 0. For the center node,
One can show that x 1 (1) > c as long as 1 2 < c < 1 and a > 0. For i = 2, . . . , (N + 1)/2,
, and x i (1) > a as long as 0 < a < 1 and c > 1 2 . By induction, the states of the agents i = 1, . . . , (N + 1)/2 are strictly monotonically increasing and will converge to 1 as time goes to infinity. The equilibrium
] T is unstable.
V. NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
In this section, we perform several simulations to show the rich asymptotic behaviors of the system (3), including some equilibria not studied in Section III. In each of the following simulations, a two-island network model with each island consisting of 50 nodes is considered. For each node, the number of neighbors of the same type is n 1 p s = n 2 p s = 4 and the number of neighbors of the other type is n 1 p d = n 2 p d = 2. Edges are bidirectional, i.e. (j, i) ∈ E then (i, j) ∈ E, but the weights w ij and w ji are not necessarily equal, thus making the graph directed. In particular, if (j, i) ∈ E, we drawn w ij from a uniform distribution with interval [0.5, 1.5], and set w ii = 0 for all i ∈ V.
In the first case, we consider when b i for all i ∈ V are chosen randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval [1.01, 1.5], i.e. all individuals have strong bias. The initial states of the agents are chosen randomly from a uniform distribution in the interval [0, 1], and the evolution of the states of the agents are illustrated in Fig. 1 , from which one can see that the system reaches an extreme polarization equilibrium. If b i for all i ∈ V are much larger than 1, we observe from extensive simulations that extreme polarization is also observed for a large class of strongly connected network topologies such as regular graphs, random graphs, and smallworld graphs. This illustrates the important role of individuals with strong bias in creating a polarized network state.
To illustrate that there are other equilibria which are very different to those analyzed in Section III, we present the following simulations. We now draw b i for all i ∈ V from a uniform distribution of interval ∈ [0.5, 1.5], so that some individuals have weak bias and some have strong bias. If the initial states are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution in [0, 1], then Fig. 2 illustrates that the states of most of the agents converge either to 0 or 1 and the final states of the remaining agents lie in between. Again, similar results to Fig. 2 can be observed in other network topology types, including path networks, regular networks and small-world networks. Now consider the case where b i for all i ∈ V belongs to a uniform distribution of interval ∈ (0, 1). For initial states uniformly randomly chosen from the interval [0, 1], two situations are typically observed for the state evolution of the system. In the first situation, the states of all agents converge either to 1 or 0, and in the other situation, the states of most of the agents converge to values close either to 0 or 1 and the final states of the remaining agents lie in [0, 1]. As all b i values tend closer to 0, the situation in which the states of all the agents converge to an extreme consensus equilibrium occurs more frequently. When b i is close to 1, for some specific initial states, the agents converge to two clusters of opinions close to the extreme polarization equilibria. For example, we consider b i ∈ [0.8, 0.9] under the two-island network, and the initial states of agents 1 to 50 are randomly chosen from a uniform distribution of interval [0.15, 0.2] and the remaining agents have initial states from a uniform distribution of interval [0.75, 0.8]. Fig. 3 shows that the network converges to a steady state in which the two islands have states that are close to the extreme values of 0 and 1.
Remark 3:
We have shown that there are equilibria other than those studied in Section III. Although not shown, we also observed that heterogeneous b i can generate equilibria that does not exist for a homogeneous bias parameter. Similarly, there may be equilibria for undirected networks which do not exist for directed graphs, and vice versa. 
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have studied the equilibria and their stability for a recently proposed nonlinear opinion dynamics model with biased assimilation in which each agent is associated with a bias parameter. We have shown that, with heterogeneous bias parameter values, the stability of certain equilibria depend on the degree of bias and the topology of the neighbor relationships among the agents. Both theoretical analyses and numerical simulations have shown that both the value of the bias parameter and the network topology play a key role in determining the limiting opinion distributed in the network. For future work, we aim to further study the region of attraction of the different equilibria and explore the general convergence condition for arbitrary strongly connected networks and arbitrary initial states, though a conjecture was given in Section III.
